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I construct dynamic economic models which focus on an elderly person's decision
whether to move in response to changes in his or her health status. The models specify three
health states (good, moderately disabled, and poor), three matching housing states (conventional,
transitional, and institutional), and explicitly include several different kinds of mobility costs,
including the direct utility costs, the indirect health effects of mobility, and, in the more complex
model, financial transaction costs.
The first model I present examines elderly mobility in a simple environment in which
utility depends only on the match between housing and health, and a bequest. The second model
extends the first to incorporate housing prices, household wealth, and elderly consumption
decisions.
Extensive simulations of the two models show that both predict considerable mobility,
even when mobility costs are large. The results also highlight the importance of transitional
housing, and provide evidence on the relationship between housing, mobility, household wealth,
and consumption.
Jonathan S. Feinstein
Yale School of Organization and Management
Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200Elderly Heilth. Housing, &nd Mobility - I
Section1: Introduction
The growing population of elderly persons in the U.S. poses many challenges for
American society and policymakers, some of the most important of which involve providing
appropriate housing for elderly who suffer from health-related disabilities.
Elderly persons are vulnerable to a wide spectrum of disabilities, of differing degrees
of severity, creating a need for many different kinds of elderly housing and home services.
extending from the demand for homes with particular architectural features, like wheel-
chair access, through the need for home health care and basic community services, to
requirements of severely disabled individuals for intensive nursing home care. During the
past few decades the need for these many kinds of housing has been widely recognized, and
the growth in alternative elderly housing arrangements holds out the promise of a world
in which each elderly person is matched to his or her "ideal" kind of housing, and, wheii
the person's health status changes, he or she moves into her new preferred housing state.
Although this vision is appealing, it ignores a number of important issues, especially
the role of mobility costs and economic factors in elderly housing decisions. Previous
research supports the view that most elderly persons who have lived in their dwelling for
an extended period of time prefer to stay put, and not to move, if possible; see for example
Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Venti and Wise (1989), and Sheiner and \Veil (1992), all
of whom document the fact that mobility rates are very low among the elderly. In part
the unwillingness of elderly persons to move derives from the emotional attachment they
feel to their homes (see Danigelis and Fengler (1991)), and in part it derives from the very
high costs which moving imposes on the elderly, including psychological, health-related.
and financial costs (see Golant (1984)). Elderly often seem more willing to endure the daily
hardships and inconveniences caused by the mismatch between their impaired functional
skills and those demanded by their living environment, than to bear the high cost of
moving. The fact that an elderly person may not wish to move as her health deteriorates
significantly complicates the simple vision which imagines perfectly matching housing to
health status, and suggests that attachment behavior and mobility costs must be included
in any policy analysis which seeks to evaluate the attractiveness and likely utilization of
alternative housing options.
In addition, housing of almost any kind is expensive to own or to rent, and many kinds
of home-related health services, notably nursing care, are also extremely costly. HenceElderly Health, Housing, and \lobility 2
elderlyhousing decisions invariably depend upon the prices of the various housing options,
expected changes in those prices, and household wealth, and are linked to decisions about
consumption and desired bequests, themselves complex topics which have been widely
investigated (see the survey by Hurd (1990)). Again, comprehensive analyses of elderly
housing must consider the effect of prices, and the link between housing decisions and
other economic decisions made by elderly households.
My purpose in this paper is to investigate the relationship between elderly health
and elderly housing decisions, and, in particular, to examine the effect of mobility costs
and economic factors on this relationship. To explore these issues, I construct a conven-
tional dynamic economic model, draw upon published sources to pa.rameterize the model,
and then present the results of computer simulations which I have used to characterize
the model's implications. In fact, I actually construct two models, the first simpler and
designed to illustrate the main ways in which health and housing interact, and the second
extending the first to incorporate economic factors.
The two models share a number of features which are central to my investigation.
Both follow an elderly person from age 65 through age 90, determining the individual's
mobility decision and housing choice at each age, as a function of sex, health status and
previous year's housing state. Both also employ particular parameterizations of morbid-
ity and mortality transition probabilities, based on published sources, which specify an
individual's future health status, as a function of age, sex, and current health. Finally,
in modeling health and housing states, both models consider a world in which an elderly
person can fall into one of three health states, good health, moderate disability, or poor
health, and must choose to live in one of three housing states: conventional (non-elderly
specific) housing; transitional housing, which is meant to include a variety of housing op-
tions, including retirement communities, life care (see Feinstein and Keating (1992) for
a discussion), and shared living; or institutional housing, including nursing homes and
hospices.
Within this general context the first model focuses on two issues. First, it intro-
duces a simple utility function which assumes that an individual's utility is highest when
his residence type "matches" his health status, and lower when the two are mismatched;
according to this specification a moderately disabled individual is happiest living in tran-
sitional housing, and earns lower utility in either conventional housing or an institution,
while a person in good health prefers conventional housing, and a person in poor healthElderly Health, HousingandMobility - 3
doesbest in an institution. Second, this first model considers several different kinds of
mobility costs, including a separation or attachment cost, a direct but temporary utility
cost, and a health cost.
The analysis of the first model confirms that when there are no mobility costs an
individual will always move in response to changes in his health status (into his new
preferred housing state), and that moving costs reduce mobility, with higher costs reducing
mobility to a greater extent. More interestingly, the analysis highlights the importance
of transitional housing. I find that for most parameterizations individuals who fall into
moderate disability choose to move into transitional housing. In contrast, individuals who
fall into poor health often choose not to move into an institution, even in versions of the
model with relatively low mobility costs, and especially at younger ages. When combined,
as they are in many of the simulations, these two patterns result in transitional housing
playing the role of an "absorbing state," so that once an elderly person moves into such
housing he stays there for the rest of his life. As a related finding, a mobility pattern rarely
observed is one in which an elderly person skips over transitional housing, choosing not to
move from conventional housing into transitional housing when first becoming moderately
disabled, and then moving directly into an institution when he falls into poor health.
The second model extends the first to place greater emphasis on household wealth and
bequest, to incorporate housing prices, and, most importantly, to model the individuals
consumption decision each period jointly with his housing decision. The simulation results
for this model generally confirm the findings for the first model, particularly the importance
of transitional housing. The results also illustrate the link between consumption, savings,
spend down of assets, and housing choices; for example, elderly with very low wealth are
predicted to follow a "bankruptcy" strategy in which they consume their remaining wealth,
then move into an institution where they become a ward of the state. Generally, both the
first and second model seem able to predict realistic mobility patterns, offering support for
the augmented economic model of elderly decision-making which I develop.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
first model, including the parameterizations of the health transition matrices and other key
variables. Section 3 presents the simulation results for the first model. Section 4 describes
the second model, and section 5 presents the simulation results for this model. Finally,
section 6 offers some concluding comments, and an appendix discusses the procedure used
to construct the transition matrices.Elderly Health,Hoiisng, and Nlobiluy4
Section2: Initial model; specification and parameterization
In this section I present an initial, relatively simple model of elderly health and
mobility. This first model assumes that an elderly person's utility in any year depends only
on the match between housing type and health in that year, and on whether or not the
person has moved in the current or previous year. Lifetime utilityis assumed to be equal to
the sum of discounted annual utilities, plus a bequest. Since it is focused almost entirely on
the relationship between health arid housing, the model is well suited to an investigation of
the relationship between changes in health status and both housing mobility and housing
characteristics, as I hope to show in section three, where I review the results of simulating
the model. However, the model cannot address how elderly health status and mobility costs
effect and are effected by financial incentives and economic decisions, because it includes
only a very limited role for household wealth (restricting its impact to the bequest), and
does not incorporate any role for annuity income, housing prices, or consumption decisions.
The second model, presented in section four, extends the model of this section to include
these various factors.
In presenting the model, I first define the various health states, health transition
probabilities, and housing states used in the analysis. Next I describe utility, and two
kinds of mobility costs, direct utility costs of moving and indirect health costs. In the last
part of the section I consider the elderly person's decision-making process in more detail,
outlining the the dynamic programming method of analysis I have used to determine the
mobility patterns implied by the model. Since I analyze the model via computer simula-
tions, I must parameterize several different functions and distributions which appear in the
model, including health transition probabilities, mortality profiles, and utility. The param-
eterizations I have chosen are described together with the model, and presented in several
tables, with the appendix providing greater details about the sources and methods used to
construct these tables. For completeness and and to provide greater understanding of how
sensitive the model's solution is to changes in parameterization, separate parameterizations
are specified for men and women.
I end this brief introduction to the model with two notes. First, most aspects of the
model, including the parameterizations, are carried over to the model presented in section
four. Second, throughout the paper the analysis is couched in terms of a single elderly
person (a one person household), either male or female; the extension to an elderly couple,
possibly living with or as dependents, is important but is left to future work.Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility - 5
Healthand housing states
Consider a 65 year old man or woman, who lives alone, but is assumed to have heirs
who will inherit any remaining wealth, including housing wealth, when he or she dies. The
man or woman is assumed to be in good health, and to own his or her home.
Beginning at age 66, and for each year thereafter, the individual faces a risk of de-
teriorating health or death. To formalize this risk and the different levels of ill health
associated with it, I assume that in each year for which she remains alive the individual
finds herself in one of three health states: "good health", "moderately disabled health", or
poor health". I define good, moderately disabled, and poor health in terms of limitations
of activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living( IADLs), so
as to conform with standard gerontologic terminology. Thus "good health," means that
the individual has essentially no limitations of daily life, that is, zero ADLs and zero to two
IADLs. A person in "moderately disabled health" suffers from several IADLs and perhaps
one or two ADLs. Such an individual is likely to endure minor or moderate inconveniences
in a traditional family home, particulary if there are stairs or other encumbrances, and
may benefit from living in an environment of congregate or shared housing, a suitable
retirement community, or simply a well designed apartment with ready access to trans-
portation, shopping, and other activities (see Altman, Lawton, and Wohiwill (1984) for
a fuller discussion), Someone in "poor health" possesses significant limitations, includ-
ing several ADL limitations and numerous IADL limitations. Thus "poor health" is, as
defined, approximately equivalent to the condition of patients who would benefit from
considertion for, are resident in, or are about to be admitted to a long-term care facility
such as a nursing home. The fact that these definitions mesh with standard gerontologic
terminology is critical for my analysis, because the published data I have relied upon to
parameterize the model describes health status almost exclusively in terms of ADL and
IADL limitations.
An individual of given health status at age t will, at age t + 1, either be in one of the
three health states described above, or will be dead. Further, as will become clear later
in this section, the elderly person's decision whether or not to move at age t, and where
to move, depends on her expectation of what her health is likely to be like at age i + 1
and subsequent ages. Thus a central feature of the model is the paramaterization of the
transition probabilities which describe the movement from health states at age t to states
at age t + 1. Tables 1 and 2 depict these transition probabilities. Table 1 lists, for each ageElderly Health, Hou5ing,and Mobility-
andseparately for men and women, the nine numbers contained in the three by tlire
transition matrix that governs transitions from each health state at age t to each of the
three living states at age t + 1; as the table makes clear, these probabilities are different
at each age. Table 2 describes the mortality risk at age t + 1, as a function of health at
age t, again separately for men and women.
The health transition probabilities depicted in tables 1 and 2 apply only to the case
in which the individual does not move at age t, or moves but suffers no increased risk of
ill health or death as a consequence. Later in this section I will describe how the numbers
in tables 1 and 2 are altered, in models in which mobility is assumed to increase the risk
of ill health and death, if an elderly man or woman chooses to move at age t.
The appendix provides details about the construction of tables 1 and 2. Here I
restrict myself to several brief comments about the tables. I have relied primarily on two
sets of sources in constructing the tables. One source is the series of papers published by
Manton and his coauthors, which present data from the National Long-Term Care Survey
(see especially Manton (1988); see also Liu, Ma.nton arid Liu (1990)); these papers provide
considerable information on the transitions between respectively, good health, moderate
disability, and death. The other source is the tables presented in Feinstein and Keating
(1992), which are derived from the National Nursing Home Survey and several econometric
analyses of nursing home admissions and discharge data; these tables provide information
about the transition into and out of what I have called poor health. The numbers in
these two sources do not always agree; when they do not, the numbers in tables 1 and
2 generally represent a compromise between them. In addition, the probabilities in the
tables reflect smoothing which was used to guarahtee certain monotonicity properties over
time, for example that the probability a man in good health at age t remains in good
health at age t + 1 falls smoothly as t rises. One limitation of the tables is that the
numbers contained in them refer to a representative or "base case" elderly man or woman;
in reality, of course, elderly men, and elderly women, differ substantially from one another
in their actual morbidity and mortality experiences, and these individual differences are
not captured by the tables.
Just as a person finds herself in one of three health states in each year, she also
occupies one of three kinds of housing. One kind of housing is denoted "conventional";
this housing, of which a good example is a detached single family dwelling, is best suited
to individuals in good health, and poses modest difficulties for individuals in moderatelyElderly Heaiih, Houstng,ndMobility - 7
disabledhealth, and severe difficulties for individuals in poor health. The second kind of
housing is denoted "transitional", and may be thought of as catering to the moderately
disabled elderly person; included in this group are congregate and other kinds of shared
housing, retirement communities in which services are provided by management or oth-
erwise readily accessible, and other kinds of independent housing —generallyapartments
and flats —locatednear transportation, shops, and other services. Finally, the third kind
of housing is "institutional care", including nursing homes, hospices, and other kinds of
intensive care facilities.
In introducing three housing states, I am positing a slightly richer housing state
space than has licen used in most previous studies in the economics of aging, which have
either focused exclusively on what I have called conventional housing, or have considered
the dichotomous choice between conventional housing and institutional care. I am thus
taking one step towards the direction of incorporating into analytic model-building the vast
swath of "transitional housing" available to the elderly. In fact, I am greatly simplifying
the actual diversity of housing types available to elderly persons, since I have consolidated
many different kinds of housing into the single category "traiisitional': nonetheless, as the
analysis to follow will demonstrate, even this simple extension of the standard approach
yields considerable insight into elderly mobility patterns.
In each period, the elderly person chooses whether to remain in her previous housing
state, or to move to a new housing state. I discuss this decision-making process further
below.
Utility and bequest
The health and housing states described above are linked together by a utility func-
tion which specifies that utility in a given year depends upon the match between health
and housing. The idea behind this formulation is that each health state has associated with
it an ideal housing situation which provides the optimal mixture of support and amenities.
Thus good health is most enjoyable if an elderly person lives in conventional housing, with
the many amenities that conventional homes afford, including privacy, space, and aesthetic
value. In contrast, moderately disabled health is most successfully accomodated in tran-
sitional housing, in which an elderly person finds support which makes daily living easier
and simpler, while maintaining a reasonable amount of freedom and independence. Finally,
poor health is tolerated best if the elderly person resides in a long-term care facility.Elderly HealthHousing, nd\lobIity -4
Theutility function formalizes the idea of an optimal match between health and
housing by letting utility in a given year depend upon both health and housing state. For
a given health state, utility is highest if a person resides in the home which matches that
health state, as described above, and is reduced if the person resides in some other kind of
home. Table 3 depicts the utility values used as benchmarks for most of the simulations
reported later in the paper. Utility is set to 1.0 if a person is healthy and resides in a
conventional home. Utility falls to 0.9 if the person is healthy but lives in transitional
housing, and falls to 0.5 if the person is healthy but lives in an institution or equivalent.
Similarly, if a person is in moderately disabled health, utility attains its highest level, 0.7.
if he lives in transitional housing, and falls to 0.4 if he lives in conventional housing or
institutional housing. Finally, utility is 0.4 if a person in poor health lives in an institution,
and falls to 0.1 and 0.2, respectively, if that person lives in conventional or transitional
housing. Note that utility is assessed at the end of the period, so that if a person moves,
his utility in the year in question corresponds to the match between his health and his
final housing state.
The diagonal entries of the utility matrix correspond to the highest utility which can
be achieved in each health state. The first diagonal element, 1.0, is a normalization, but the
remaining two diagonal entries reflect the degree to which utility falls as health deteriorates,
even when a person resides in an optimal living environment. The value 0.7 was chosen
to reflect evidence on health dependent utilities presented by Torrance (1986) and Viscusi
and Evans (1990) and the collection of articles in Walker and Rosser (1993). Torrance
discusses in some detail the methodologic underpinnings of using a Quality Adjusted Life
Year (QALY) index to measure the disutility of ill health, and provides estimates suggesting
that a year spent in moderate ill health has a QALY-equivalent of about .7 of that of a year
spent in good health. Viscusi and Evans estimate health dependent utility functions, and
find that the marginal utility of a given level of income is approximately .7 or .8 as large in
states of moderate ill health as in states of good health; assuming a simple multiplicative
form for utility (as I do in the model specified in section four) and that other forms of
consumption remain constant, generates the implication that a year spent in moderate ill
health is worth .7 or .8 of a year spent in good health. The edited edition by Walker and
Rosser contains descriptions of several of the most well known indices used to measure
quality-of-life.
The value 0.4 was chosen based on consideration of various sources which describe theElderly Health Housing, and Mobility 9
reductionsin quality-of-life which accompany various kinds of disabilities; see the collection
of papers in Walker and Rosser (1993) and Birren, et. a!. (1991) for further discussion of
the various indices used to assess the impact of disability.
The off-diagonal elements in the utility matrix indicate the reduction in utility an
elderly person experiences when she does not reside in the housing state which matches
her health status. Since there is little direct evidence available which might help determine
these values, I have tried to pick reasonable values. I have also explored the sensitivity of
my results to variations in the most important of these off-diagonal elements, which turns
out to be element (2,1), which describes the utility accruing to a moderately disabled
person who lives in a conventional home. This particular element is important for several
reasons. First, it describes the most common non-optimal match: when an elderly person
enters the model at age 65 in good health and living in conventional housing, the health
transition that he is most likely to experience in subsequent years is to moderate disability,
in which case, if he chooses not to move, his utility is given by element (2,1). Second, the
model allows considerable discretion in the choice of this value, particularly as compared
with the range of feasible values for the off-diagonal elements corresponding to the case of
poor health. Thus utility for an individual whose health status is moderately disabled can
rise as high as 0.7 if he chooses to live in transitional housing, leaving considerable latitude
in the choice of how far utility falls if the individual instead lives in a different kind of
housing; in contrast, for an individual in poor health, the highest utility he can achieve is
0.4 (realized if the individual resides in an institution), a rather small number which leaves
less latitude in the choice of how far utility falls in non-optimal housing states.
Element (2,1) of utility is set at 0.4 in the base case, a reduction of approximately
43% from the peak utility of 0.7 attainable in the health state of moderate disability. One
can argue that this is too steep a reduction; hence in the simulations I have explored
alternative values of this parameter, specifically 0.5 (28% reduction), 0.6 (15% reduction).
and 0.63 (10% reduction).
Lifetime utility is the discounted sum of annual utilities, discounted at a rate of either
.9 or .95 in the simulations.1
In additional to accruing utility in each year of life, an elderly person gains utility
upon death in the form of a bequest left to his heirs. Following Feinstein and Keating, I as-
sume that total lifetime utility is an additively separable function of the sum of discountedElderly Health, Housing, and Nloldity - tO
annualutilities and a bequest function which takes the form
B(W)= [L3(1V — ec)1°
whereWisend-of-life wealth, ec are end-of-life health costs, and /3andc are parameters;
the bequest is discounted at the same rate as annual utility. I assume that the elderly
person possesses wealth TV0 at age 65; for the simulations I report in section threeis
set at $500,000, while in the later simulations of the model presented in section four TV0 is
chosen to be $250,000. In the model of this section, in which wealth plays only a small role.
I assume that wealth then shrinks by a fixed proportion 9 each year the individual remains
alive, an assumption which is meant to represent a very crude form of asset spend down,
and I set 9 to .9. Following Scitovsky (1988), 3C is set equal to $20,000, independent of
age or sex.2 Finally, /3 is set equal to .00002 and &isset equal to 0.5; at these values. a
bequest of 1,000, 000 is worth approximately 4.5 years of healthy life lived in conventional
housing, and a bequest of 100,000 is worth approximately 1.5 years of healthy life.
Mobility costs
For the model developed in this section, I consider three kinds of mobility costs. The
first kind is a temporary utility cost, whereby an individual's utility in a particular year
is lowered by a fixed amount if he has moved during the year, or, in some specifications,
if he has moved during either the current or previous year. The second kind is a health
cost, which increases the probability that an individual will either suffer a deterioration in
health status or death in the year(s) following a move. Finally, the third kind of mobility
cost is a separation cost, meant to capture the emotional loss experienced when a person
moves away from a home in which she has lived for a prolonged period. I apply the concept
of separation cost by assuming that at age 65 an individual occupies a dwelling she has
lived in for a long period of time, and that, upon her first move away from this home, she
suffers a fixed utility loss which continues for all the remaining years of her life.
Most of the evidence about these three kinds of mobility costs is anecdotal, and
cannot be used to determine the specific magnitude of each cost.3 In the case of the
temporary utility and separation costs, I have avoided choosing a single numerical value
for the costs, preferring instead to simulate the model over a relatively wide range of
alternative values. The specification of health costs is more complex, however, and is less
amenable to alternative parameterizations; to capture some of the potential variability inElderly Health, Housing, and Moblity ii
these costs I have considered both the case in which they last one year and the case iii
which they last two years. Below I describe my parameterization of each of the three kinds
of costs in greater detail.
Consider first temporary utility costs of moving. I consider two distinct patterns
for these costs. One pattern, which I label the fiat cost pattern, assumes that the utility
cost is the same across all health states. For this pattern, I simulate the model under the
alternative cost values 0, .1, .2, .3, and .4. Note that these five values cover a wide range:
in particular, when the disutility of moving costs .4 units, the magnitude of the transaction
cost is at least 40% —itsvalue when a healthy person moves to conventional housing -and
as much as 100% —whenan individual in poor health moves to institutional housing ".
Theother pattern assumes costs which are proportional to the utility of the best housing
state available to a person of given health status. These cost structures are: .1 .08 .04.
.2 .16 .08, .3 .24 .12 and .4 .32 .16, where, for each triplet, the first number refers
to the disutility suffered by a person in good health, the second to the disutility suffered
by a moderately disabled person, and the third to the disutility suffered by someone in
poor health. For both kinds of cost patterns, I consider separately and simulate separately
models in which these direct utility costs last for one year (the year in which the move is
made) or two years.
The health costs associated with mobility possess a more complex structure than the
corresponding temporary utility and separation costs, In particular, the impact of a move
on an individual's risk of falling into worsened health or death is likely to depend upon
the individual's age, sex, and initial health status. To formalize the relationship between
mobility and health, I define a set of multipliers which multiply the baseline morbidity
and mortality transition probabilities set forth in tables 1 and 2, leading to a new pair of
tables, tables 4 and 5, which apply to individuals who have moved. As the numbers iii
tables 4 and 5 indicate, the effect of the multipliers is to raise the probability of a transition
into worsened health and death, and to lower the probability of a transition to improved
health. The multipliers vary in size; in general they are smaller the larger is the baseline
probability they multiply, and are somewhat larger for persons whose initial health status
is moderately disabled or poor, since the available evidence suggests that mobility is more
deleterious for such persons. I determined the multipliers by first choosing values for ages
65 and 90, and then using a linear interpolation scheme and a small amount of smoothing
to determine the value of the multipliers which apply between these ages.5 As an exampleElderly Health, Housing,andNlobibty - 2
ofhow the multipliers were determined, consider males in good health. Themultipliers
chosen for age 65 multiply the probability of a transition to moderatedisability by 2 0
(raising it from .051 to .102), the probability of a transition to poor health by 3.0 (raised
from .0158 to .0474), and the probability of death by 3.0 (raised from .015 to.045); the
probability of remaining in good health in the transition fromage 65 to 66 is then set
to be the residual probability, one minus the sum of the other three revised transition
probabilities. At age 90, the three multipliers fall in value to 1.5, 2.0, and 2.0,so that the
probability of a transition to moderate disability rises from .22 to .33, that fora transition
to poor health rises from .1125 to .225, and that for death rises from .104 to .208.Between
ages 65 and 90, a linear interpolation scheme smoothly adjusts each multiplier from its
value at age 65 to its value at age 90, subject to themonotonicity requirement that each
probability (other than that of remaining in good health) be nondecreasing withage. In
the simulations, I consider both the case in which themortality and morbidity costs of
moving last only a single year, and the case in which these costs last twoyears.
Finally, consider separation costs. This cost refers to the psychicdisutility which
an elderly person experiences when he or she is uprooted from a home she haslived in
for an extended period. The tremendous pain whichaccompanies such a move is widely
recognized in the gerontologic literature. For example, in No Place LikeHome, Danigelis
and Fengler (1991) write: "Home hasmany attractions for the elderly homeowner. The
sense of history and family tradition as expressed through memories andpossessions; the
feeling of familiarity and resulting security from a longtenancy in this residence; privacy,
and above all the sense of mastery and controlover environment all combine to make home
an attractive place to live out one's life." (page 9). Theygo on to cite a number of studies
which have used surveys and interviews toverify the importance of attachment to home
among elderly.
The separation cost can be modeledas follows. First, assume that at age 65 the
elderly person lives in the "family home." If theelderly person leaves the home, he or she
suffers a fixed disutility, whichpersists foranextended period, as much as the rest of
his or her life, in sharp contrast to therelatively brief costs associated with leaving more
temporary abodes. Further, once the elderlyperson leaves the family home, this fixed cost
begins, and it continues, regardless of latermobility patterns. I specify the alternative
values 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 for thiscost.
Decisions and method of analysisElderly Health HousingandMobility
Inthe model developed above, each period the elderly person chooses whetherto
remain in his current residence, or move to one of the two alternativehousing states
available to him; if he does choose to move, he incurs any mobility costs includedin
the model. The individual's decision-making process must take into accountnot only
the positive utility earned and possible mobility costs incurred in the currentperiod, but
the impact of his decision on his future expected utility. To model thisdecision-makixg
procedure and determine the elderly person's optimal choice, I employ standard dynamic
programming techniques.
Let i denote the individual's current housing state, let jdenotehis current health
state, let k1 and k2 denote the two alternative housing states, and let h1, h2, and h3
denote the three health states in the model. Further, define U(r, s) to hecurrent utility
when an individual of health status r occupies housing state.s, let x(r) denote the utility or
separation costs of moving (which may or may not depend on health status r). let qo(r,:;f)
denotethe baseline probability of a transition from health state r in period t to health
state z in period t + 1, and let q(r, z; t) denote the probability of a transition from r to
when the individual is experiencing a health cost related to moving. Finally, letV(r.
denote the value function, defined below.
Consider now the case in which the utility and health costs of moving lastonly one
year, and there are no separation costs of moving. An individual who finds himself in
health state jandhousing state z at the start of period f has the following total expected
utility if he chooses not to move:
U(j.i) + qo(j,z;t)V(:,i;t+ 1)±6[1 — qo(j,z;t)]B(W —ec)
:=l,2,3 z=12,3
where s5 is the discount factor, B() is the bequest function, defined earlier, andandect
are wealth and end-of-life costs in year t, also both defined earlier. If the individual moves
to housing state k,, his total expected utility is:
qm(j,z;t)V(z,k,;t+1)+6[1_ >qm(j,z;t)]B(Wt—ect)
z=1,2,3 x1,2,3
The individual compares these expressions across his three options, choosing that option
with highest total expected utility; this maximal expected utility is then denoted V(j, 1; t).
To solve for the elderly person's optimal decision each period, I have followed conven-
tional methods and worked backwards, beginning at age 90. For eachyear, I have analyzedElderly HeaIh, Housing, nd tobilityI
eachpossible combination of health and housing states which an individual might possess
at the beginning of the period —ninetotal states in this model —and,for each initial
combination, have determined the optimal decision.
For the most part, the procedure I have just outlined is quite straightforward. There
is one subtlety, however, which arises whenever mobility costs last for two years.Iii
that case, one must distinguish two different value functions for each health and housing
combination z and j:onevalue function, denoted Vi(i,j,t) refers to the value of being
in states z and jintwhenone has moved in the previous period and must incur further
mobility costs this period, regardless of whether or not one moves again; while the other.
denoted Vo(z.j,t), refers to the value of being in states i and jintandnot having moved
in the previous period. The above expressions for total expected utility then become:
U(j,i)6>qo(j,z;t)Vo(z,i;t+ 1) + 6[1 — qo(j,z;t)JB(W1
—fCt)
z=12,3 :=I,2,3
U(j,k1)—z(j) +6 > qm(j,z;i)Vi(z,ki;t+1)+6[1_>qm(j,z;t)]B(Vt—ect)
z=1,2.3 z1,2,3
inthe case in which the elderly person did not move last period, with the optimal expected
utility generating V(j,i;t); when the elderly person did move last period, the second
expression remains the same, but the first becomes
U(j, i) —x(j)+ 6 q(j, z; t)(z, 1: t + 1) + 6[1 —> qm(j,z; t)}B(V1 —CCt)
z1,2,3 z1,2,3
andthe optimal expected utility is denoted Vj(j,i;t).
The expressions for total expected utility are slightly different for the separation cost
model. Consider this model for the case in which there are both separation costs and a
one year health cost of moving. If the individual has never left his age-65 home, his utility
from remaining there is:
U(j,i) + 6 qo(j,z;t)Vo(z,i;t + 1) + 6[1 — qo(j,z;i)]B(W
—ec1)
z1,2,3 z=l,2,3
whereV0 refers to the value function when he resides in his age-65 home and has never
moved in the past. If he has never left his age-65 home but contemplatesmoving, his
utility is:
U(j,k1)—x6 >qm(j,z;t)Vi(z,k:;t+1)+6[1-_ qm(j,z;t)]B(TVz—cr)
=l,2,3 z=1,2,3Elderly Health, Housing and Mobility 15
wherex is the separation cost and V1 refers to the value function if he has moved. Finally.
if he lives elsewhere than in his age-65 home, his utility is
U(j,i)—x+>2qo(j,z;t)V(z, i;t + 1) +5[1
—>2 q(j,z; t)]B(1V1—
:=l,2,3 z=1,2,3
if he chooses not to move, and
U(j,k,)—r+ >2qm(j.z;t)(:,ki;t+ 1)+6[1—>i: qm(j.:;t)JB(W1—c)
z=1,2,3 i1,2,3
ifhe chooses to move.
Section 3: Simulation results for the first model
In this section 1 summarize the results of an extensive set of simulations of the
model presented iii the previous section. The most interesting aspect of this model is its
predictions of how mobility patterns and housing choices are likely to vary in response to
variations in the magnitude of mobility costs. In order to properly gauge this response
pattern, I have considered a wide range of mobility cost parameters in the simulations.
Further, since these mobility patterns and housing choices are my main interest, I focus
most of my discussion on these issues, and say very little about either the calculation of
utility or the predicted value functions.
In interpreting the simulation results, it is useful to define a benchmark against
which to measure the extent of mobility predicted by any particular parameterization of
the model. For this purpose note that, according to the model, when all mobility costs
are zero an elderly person will move each time she experiences a change in health status.
generating what may conveniently be called the complete mobility pattern. In much of the
discussion below, I will present results in terms of the ways in which a particular mobility
pattern deviates from the complete mobility pattern.
Figure 1 presents some descriptive results from simulating the model with no mobility
costs. This figure, and all subsequent figures, forecasts the life history of an elderly person
who enters the model at age 65 in good health and living in conventiontl housing. The
top panel of the figure depicts the probability of a move, as a function of age; specifically.
the panel shows, for both men and women, the conditional probability, given that the
individual is alive in a particular year, that the individual will move, with the probabilityElderly Health, Housing,and Mobility -ii;
assessedbased on a population which is in good health and conventional housing at age
65, and which experiences health transitions according to the probabilities in tables 1 and
2. Note that the probability of a move increases sharply with age. This increase is due to
two factors: first, as individuals age, those in good health are more likely to experience
deterioration in health status; and second, at older ages a larger fraction of the population
is likely to suffer from some degree of disability, and therefore be relatively more likely
than those in good health to experience a change in health status. In interpreting this
and subsequent figures, note that an individual may well move more than once; thus the
predicted probability of a move in later years is an average of three terms, each term
representing the product of the probability of residing in one of the three possible housing
states at the beginning of the year multiplied times the probability of a move, conditional
on beginning the period in that housing state. The average annual mobility rate implied
by the figure is 14%, well above the true mobility rate among the elderly, which is closer
to 7%, according to figures presented in Feinstein and McFadden (1989).
The lower panel of figure 1 illustrates the probability that the elderly person will
live in conventional, transitional, or institutional housing, again as a function of age and
separately for men and women. In this panel notice that the probability of living in
transitional housing rises sharply with age, reflecting the fact that most of those alive at
later ages belong to the moderately disabled health category; the probability of residing
in an institution rises more slowly, increasing from approximately 1% at younger ages to
approximately 15% by age 90.
In discussing the simulations, I first discuss the results of simulating models in which
there is both a temporary utility cost of moving and a health cost, then go on to discuss
results from models in which there is both a separation cost and a health cost, and conclude
by examining the sensitivity of some of my results to variations in the off-diagonal utility
element (2,1), a particularly crucial parameter which was mentioned earlier and which
measures the extent to which utility falls when a moderately disabled person lives in
conventional housing.
Consider first the class of models in which there is both a temporary utility cost and a
health cost of moving. Figure 2 provides some descriptive results for a particular model in
this class, the one for which the utility cost of moving is set at 0.4 and lasts for twoyears.
and the health cost also lasts for two years; this particular model contains the highest
level of mobility costs of any I have examined in this class, and hence offers a particularlyElderly Health, Housing, and Mobility- 17
striking and informative comparison with the zero mobility cost model discussed above
and for which comparable results are depicted in figure 1.
The top panel in figure 2 reveals that mobility is substantially lower in this case
than in the zero mobility cost case. In particular, for both men and women mobility is
comparable to the zero cost case at young ages, but does not rise smoothly with age:
instead, for women mobility gradually falls, only to rise sharply during the last few years
of life, while for men, after increasing for a few years mobility plummets to zero (at age 72).
then rapidly increases from zero at age 77, only to fall thereafter. The lower panel in figure
2 depicts, for each age1 the fraction of the population living in conventional, transitional.
and institutional housing. As in the corresponding panel in figure 1, the proportion of
individuals living in conventional housing falls with age, while the proportion living in
transitional housing rises. The most significant difference between this graph and the
corresponding panel in figure 1 is that in this case the proportion of individuals residing
in institutional housing is zero at all ages.
A detailed examination of the simulation results produces the following explanations
for these patterns. At younger ages, for both men and women, individuals who fall into
moderate disability always choose to move immediately into transitional housing. However.
beginning at age 74, and continuing until age 78, and then beginning again at age ST. ini
who fall into moderate disability and live in conventional housing choose not to move:
this fact explains both the deep trough in the male mobility pattern between ages 74
and 77 and the sharp spike at age 78 (due to a queue), as well as the decline in male
mobility at later ages. At all ages individuals who fall into poor health choose not to
move into an institution, and individuals who live in transitional housing and recover to
good health choose not to move back into conventional housing; these facts explain why
mobility is lower overall in this case than in the zero cost case, and contributes towards an
understanding of why mobility rates do not increase with age. Finally, for women mobility
decreases between ages 85 and 87 as those in moderate disability choose not to move into
conventional housing, only to rise sharply during the last few years of life when moves into
transitional housing resume.
Although results from models in which the utility cost and health costs of moving
last only one year, or in which the utility cost is less than 0.4, differ in some respects from
the model discussed above, the results from all models in this class share certain qualitative
features in common. Overall, the simulation results for this class indicate that mobilityElderly Health, Housing, and Mobility -18
is less common as mobility costs increase, as expected. Nonetheless, the results also show
that mobility costs must be quite substantial in order to significantly reduce mobility. To
see this consider again the model discussed at length above. In this model mobility is
in fact considerably lower than in the zero mobility cost model depicted in figure 1: iii
particular, average mobility has fallen from approximately 14% a year to approximately
5%, a value which is reasonably consistent with empirical evidence. However, this model
incorporates very substantial mobility costs: the direct utility costs are 40% of the highest
attainable one-year utility, are considerably more than 40% for those in worse health, and
last over two years, while the indirect health costs last over two years and are, by ally
measure, steep. Apparently, mobility costs must be this high in order to produce realistic
mobility patterns.
Beyond the simple finding that mobility falls with increasing costs, the simulation
results suggest several other conclusions. One conclusion is that individuals who fall into
poor health often are unwilling to bear the relatively high transaction costs of moving
(relative to utility) to an institution, and often choose to remain in current housing. In-
terestingly, the results suggest that individuals who fall into poor health are most likely
to move at more advanced ages, presumably in part because they are then less likely to
experience an improvement in health in the future, and therefore can expect to benefit
less from staying where they are. A second conclusion is that persons whose health mi-
proves from moderately disabled or poor to good are often unwilling to move back into
conventional housing, especially at advanced ages, presumably because they are likely to
lapse back into poor health in the near future. Thus reverse flows are discouraged by
mobility costs. A third result is that, for many sets of simulations, transaction costs affect
mobility more at older ages than at younger ages, in the sense that mobility 'patterns vary
more with variations in transaction costs at these ages (this result is well illustrated by a
comparison of the top panels of figures 1 and 2).
Perhaps the most striking mobility pattern concerns individuals who fall into the
health category, moderately disabled. Throughout nearly all of the simulation results
such individuals, whether they were previously in good or poor health, choose to move
(immediately) into transitional housing upon falling into moderate disability. In contrast,
in models for which the transaction costs of moving are high individuals do not always move
into institutional housing if they fall into poor health, and do not always move back into
conventional housing if their health improves from poor or moderately disabled to good.Elderly Heiflh, Housing, and Mobihty -19
The combination of these two patterns results, in many circumstances, in transitional
housing being a pre-death absorbing state: once an individual moves into this kind of
housing, he or she may never leave, even when his or her health status changes.
The fact that individuals move into transitional housing so often has several impor-
tant implications. First, this finding highlights the importance of including such a housing
state in empirical models of aging and housing choice —reducinghousing to the two states
"conventional" and "institutional" precludes exactly those mobility patterns which eco-
nomic theory, as developed in this paper, predicts will occur most frequently in an elderly
population. Second, from the viewpoint of elderly housing policy, this finding suggests
that transitional housing could play an important role in improving elderly well-being.
particularly in a world in which mobility is costly.
On examination, the finding that indviduals choose to move into transitional housiin
so readily can be explained as due in part to the fact that in this intermediate housing
state elderly can choose not to move again should their health either deteriorate further or
improve, without suffering a huge disutility as a consequence (support for this hypothesis
comes from the fact that elderly do not always move when they fall into poor health oi
their health improves from moderately disabled to good). This rationale is one which woubi
not be uncovered by static or nonoptimizing models, but is highlighted by tbdyIot11n
programming approach taken in this paper.
It is interesting to note that according to the simulation results the movement into
an institution tends to be reduced relatively more by mobility costs than the inoveineiit
into transitional housing. Specifically, the results suggest that it is often the case that an
individual will move into transitional housing upon a deterioration from good to moder-
ately disabled health, and then choose not to move into an institution when his health
deteriorates further to poor; whereas the opposite mobility pattern, in which the individ-
ual chooses not to move from conventional into transitional housing when his health first
deteriorates from good to moderately disabled, but then moves directly from conventional
housing into an institution when his health deteriorates further to poor, zs never observed.
With one exception, it is never the case that an individual who chooses to move
decides not to move into the housing state which matches his current health status. This
one exception occurs when a person who was previously in poor health recovers to good
health (this transition has probability zero in the simulations and therefore is not directly
relevant; but the mobility pattern described still has inherent interest). In this situation.Elderly Health,Housing, and Mobility -20
andfor certain parameter values, the person moves into transitional housing, a result which
again highlights the importance of the dynamic programming approach (since this would
never occur in a one period static model).
Now consider the class of models in which there is both a permanent separation cost
incurred when an individual leaves his "family home" (his home as of age 65), as well as a
one year health cost incurred following all moves. Figure 3 describes the model in this class
for which the separation cost is 0.2. The top panel in this figure shows that for both men
and women there is no mobility until age 71, at which age there is a very large mobility
spike, followed by an initially steep and progressively more gradual decline iii mobility at
laterages. This mobility pattern is not difficult to understand, in the light of the nature of
the mobility costs individuals face. Young elderly are unwilling to leave their age-65 home.
since doing so results in a permanent cost. Eventually, in this case at age 71, the benefits
of moving outweight the costs for those in moderate disability or poor health, and the large
number in these health states do move hence the spike at this age. In subsequent years.
elderly continue to move from conventional housing into transitional housing when their
health deteriorates from good to moderately disabled; but since fewer and fewer persons
live in conventional housing and possess good health, this flow contributes less to overall
mobility. Meanwhile, at all ages individuals who fall into poor health choose not to move
into an institution. Together, these two phenomena explain the gradual decline in mobility
at older ages. The lower panel in figure 3 depicts the fraction of residents in each of the
three housing states, at each age, and is fully consistent with the discussion above.
The fact that the separation cost model predicts a somewhat different mobility pat-
tern than the temporary utility cost model suggests that the relative importance empir-
ically of these two different kinds of mobility cost models could perhaps be determined
with appropriate data.
One striking qualitative feature shared by nearly all the results reviewed above is the
finding that individuals who fall into moderately disabled health often move into transi-
tional housing. While this result holds true both for individuals previously in poor health
and institutionalized as well as for individuals previously in good health and living in con-
ventional housing, it is far more common for an elderly person to deteriorate from good
health to moderate disability than to recover from poor health to moderate disability.
Since the sequence of events in which an elderly person deteriorates from good to mod-Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility -21
erately disabled health is so common, and the simulation results predict that the move
into transitional housing which accompanies this health transition is relatively likely, this
particular mobility decision seems worthy of further investigation; in particular, we may
ask how variations in the utility benefits of occupying transitional housing (as opposed to
conventional housing) affect the willingness of elderly people to move in this situation.
Recall that the utilty parameterization sets the utility associated with moderate dis-
ability and transitional housing to 0.7, and the utility associated with moderate disability
and conventional housing to 0.4 I have explored how an increase in this second parameter
affects the willingness of elderly persons to move when they fall into moderate disability.
I note that whenever this parameter is small enough that a moderately disabled person
living in conventional housing always wishes to move, the parameter has no impact (that
is, within this range varying this parameter has no effect on the model's solution). I hav
found that when the parameter is raised to 0.5, elderly continue to move in this health
state.
When the parameter is raised to 0.6, at which point the disutility associated with
remaining in conventional housing is approximately 15% (from the level of 0.7 achievcd
when the elderly person moves to transitional housing), whether or not the elderly movt
depends on the transaction costs of moving. In particular, when the health cost of moviiu
lasts one year and the utility cost is at or below 0.1 and lasts for one year, individuals
always move; when the utility cost is between 0.1 and 0.2 individuals sometimes do and
sometimes do not move, depending on their age and sex; and when the cost is 0.25 and
above, no-one moves.
Now consider what happens when the off-diagonal utility element is raised from 0.6
to 0.63, so that the disutility associated with not moving into transitional housing is only
10%. Again, assume health costs of moving which last one year. When the utility cost
of moving is zero, mobility is still not assured: among men, a move takes place only for
those 81 or older; among women, a move is made for those aged 65 to 69, and 71 on.
When the utility cost is raised to 0.07 for one year, itself 10% of the maximal utility in
the moderately disabled health state, mobility falls further: men never move; women move
beginning at age 74. When the utility cost is raised to .1, women move only between ages
78 and 83 (men never move); finally, when the cost is .15 and above, no-one ever moves in
this situation.
We conclude that if the disutility of "mismatched" housing is 15% or more, then evenElderly Heaith, Housing, and Mobility -22
when there are substantial transaction costs associated with moving (one year health costs
plus moderate utility costs), the elderly will, according to the model, move into transitional
housing.
Section 4: Second model
In this section I extend the model developed in section 2 to include a role for housing
prices, a financial transaction cost on the sale of a home, interest rates, mortgage rates.
annuity income, and an explicit consumption decision made each period jointly with t1it
housing decision already described.
The most important extension of the first model modifies the definition of utility to
include consumption, and computes the elderly individual's optimal consumption choice
each period jointly with his housing decision. Recall that in the first model utility depends
primarily on the quality of the match between housing and health, according to the function
U(j, i), where j is the individual's health state and i her housing state. The new utility
function specifies utility to be equal to log[c(t)IU(j, i), where c(t) is consumption in period
t,measuredin dollars spent. When the individual moves and incurs utility or separation
costsx, utility is defined to be log[c(t)][U(j,i)—x]. Note that according to this specification
the marginal utility of consumption depends on both health status and the match between
housing and health. Thus the marginal utility is highest for an individual in good health
residing in conventional housing, and lower for individuals in worse health, or living in ill-
suited housing. When there are utility costs of moving, the marginal utility of consumption
also falls following a move. In contrast to the logarithmic form for consumption, I have
also explored the implications of using an alternative linear specification, in which utility
is equal to c(t)[U(j, z)]; I briefly discuss the results of simulating models based on this
alternative specification in the next section.
I modify the bequest function so as to preserve the value of the bequest relative
to the utility associated with a year of healthy life. In particular, I multiply the earlier
function by seven, so that the bequest is now defined to be
B(W) = 7.O[/3(W —
Comparingthe modified bequest function to the modified utility function reveals that
a $1 million dollar bequest is now worth approximately 3 years of good health to anElderly Health, Housing, and Mobility - 23
individualliving in a conventional home and spending approximately $20, 000 annually oji
consumption.
Total utility continues to be equal to the expected value of the sum of the discounted
annual utilities plus the discounted value of the bequest.
Consider now the modifications introduced by including housing prices in the model.
Denote these prices as p1(t), p2(t), and p3(t), where p1(t) and p2(t) refer to the price
of, respectively, a conventional and a transitional home in year 2, and p3(t) refers to the
cost charged for spending year 1 in an institution. For the simulations I set pj(65) equal
to $200,000, somewhat above the median price for a detached single family dwelling in
the U.S, p2(65) equal to $150,000, on the supposition that transitional housing, of which
prime examples are retirement condominiums and townhomes, will typically be somewhat
smaller and less expensive than conventional housing, and p3(65) equal to $25, 000, which
is approximately the average cost of one year in a private nursing home facility in the U.S.
at the present time. Then I define p,(t) =p(GS)('+ ir,)65, where the it1 are rates of
appreciation (or depreciation) for the three kinds of housing.
To determine explicit values for the ir,'s, I turn to several recent publications.
Mankiw and Well (1989) and Poterba (1991) discuss possible rates of real appreciatwil
(or depreciation) for conventional homes over the next several decades, and argue that
homes will either appreciate a small amount or depreciate. Based on their discussion, I
set it1equalto .01, reflecting a 1% annual real appreciation. Elderly housing prices are
likely to fare at least as well as conventional housing prices in the decades ahead, as the
number of elderly grows; hence I also set it2 equal to .01. To explore the sensitivity of
my results to alternative rates of appreciation and depreciation,I have run a number of
additional simulations, discussed in the next section, in which I experiment with smaller
values for it1 and larger values for it2. Based on evidence presented by Maple, Donham,
and Cowan (1992), I assume that the price of one year in an institution will rise at a real
rate of 2% per year, so that ir = .02. In a number of additional simulations I assume,
as an alternative, that it3 =.04,reflecting a 4% annual rate of increase in the price of
institutional care. I have not incorporated price uncertainty into the model, for reasons of
computational complexity.
The calculation of household wealth is considerably more complicated in the new
extended model than in the original model. I will therefore describe this calculation inElderly He&lth,Housing and Mobility 24
some detail, first defining a number of key variables, and then outlining the steps required
to compute wealth in each period, for each possible housing state.
Define r to be the real rate of interest earned on savings, and define rm to be th.
real interest rate assessed on mortgages when individuals purchase a home whose value
exceeds their current wealth6; in the simulations I assume that r equals .02 and rm equals
.04. Next define A(t) to be the amount of real annuity income an individual earns at the
start of each period in which he is alive; I assume that A(t) = A0(1 + r)t_65, where .4 is
the value of the annuity at age 65, set to $18,000 in the simulations. In keeping with the
earlier model, define W0 to be total wealth as of age 65, and W to be total wealth in year
t. For the simulations I assume that WO equals $250,000, of which $200, 000 is equity in
the elderly person's home (which is assumed to be a conventional home on which no debt
is owed), and the remainder is savings; these numbers are consistent with the findings of
Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Venti and Wise (1990), and Ai, Feinstein, McFadden, and
Pollakowski (1990) that the vast majority of all elderly wealth resides in home ownership.
Finally, I assume that there is a financial transaction cost incurred whenever an elderly
person sells a home of either the conventional or transitional type, assessed at 6% of the
value of the home at the time of sale.
Suppose now that household wealth is W at the beginning of year t. To calculate
V÷1, household wealth at the beginning of the following year, it is useful to distinguish
the case in which the elderly person lives in conventional or transitional housing from the
case in which he lives in an institution. Suppose first that the household lives in either
conventional or transitional housing at the start of year t, denoted in what follows as
housing state i. Two cases then arise: either total wealth exceeds the value of the home.
in which case the household has additional savings; or total wealth falls short of the value
of the home, in which case the household has a mortgage. If the household does not move
in year t, then, in the first case, its wealth at the start of year t + 1 is equal to
p,(t+ 1)+(W —p1(t)+A(i)— c(t))(1 +r)
where it is implicitly assumed that c(t) is chosen to be less than W+A(t)—p1(t), disposable
income.7 In the second case, defining y = to be fraction of the home not owned
by the household (so that 1 —yis the fraction which is owned), household wealth is
(1 —y)p(t+ 1) —yp.(t)rm+ (A(t) —c(i))(1+ r)Elderly He.Jth, Housing,and Mobility -25
if the household consumes less than its annuity income, and
(1
—y)p;(t +1) —ypj(t)rm—(c(t)—A(t))(1+ rm)
if the household consumes more than its annuity income, where the first term refers to the
percentage of capital gains captured by the household, the second to the mortgage payment,
and the third to either the net savings or net debt created by the difference between annuity
income and consumption.8 If the household does move in year t,thecalculation is similar,
but slightly more complex. If the household moves to either conventional or transitional
housing, denoted housing state k in what follows, it pays a transaction cost d equal to
the value of the home being sold, so that d = .06p1(t). Thus total proceeds from the sale
of the home are S=(1 —y)p(t)—dwhere y = 0 if there is no mortgage on the initial
home (it is implicitly assumed that S is positive). Now let W denote the household's
total wealth immediately following sale of their home; W is equal to 5+ A(t) + W —p(t)
if the household's initial wealth exceeded p(t), and S + A(t) if not. Again, we must
distinguish the case in which the household's total wealth V exceeds the price pk(t) of the
new home from the case in which it does not. When W does exceed the purchase price,
the household's wealth in year f + 1, W.41, is given by
pk(t + 1) + (W— pk(t)—c(t))(1+ r)
whilewhen ii' falls short of the purchase price W1 is given by
Pk(t +1) -(pk(t)-- c(t))(1+ rm)
pk(t)
If the elderly person moves into an institution, the calculation of W above is identical.
If iI exceeds p3(t), the price of institutional care, household wealth in year t + 1 is simply
calculated to be
(47—p3(t) — c(t))(1+ r)
where c(t) is constrained to be no more than T'i'—p3(t). If 1' fails short of p3(t), then c(t)
is set equal to zero (in the simulations, set to a very small finite value) and W4.1 is also
set equal to zero.
Finally, let us consider the case in which the elderly person lives in an institution
at the start of year t. I assume that an individual, for whom the sum of his wealth plusElderly Health, Hou,ing and Mobility -
annuityincome falls short of the price of institutional care, remains in the institution as
a ward of the state, an assumption which is consistent with spend down rules prevalent
in most states. In this situation, c(t) is set to zero, wealth in year t + 1 is also zero.
and the individual is not allowed to move. If the individual's wealth exceeds the cost of
institutional care, then, if she chooses not to move, her wealth at the start of year t + 1 is
given by the maximum of zero and
(lV —p3(t)+ .4(t) —c(t))(1+ r)
wherec(t)isconstrained to be no larger than lV —p3(t)+ A(t). If she moves to housing
state k, then, if her total wealth, W + A(t) exceeds the cost of the home, her wealth iii
t+1 is given by
pk(t + 1) + (V + A(t) —pk(t)
—c(t))(1+ r)
ifc(t)< W + .1(t) —pk(t)and
pk(t+ 1)— (c(t)— — A(t)+ pk(t))(1 + "m)
if c(t)>Wt + .4(t) —pk(t),while if her wealth is less than the cost of the new home hei
wealth is given by
W +At'
pk(t + 1) (c(t)+pk(t) —1V)(1+ rm)
Pk (t)
To conclude my discussion of the model of this section, I will outline how the method
used to analyze the earlier model must be extended to compute individuals' optimal con-
sumption and housing decisions in the reviseed model.
As for the earlier model, let i denote the individual's current housing state, let j
denotehis current health state, let k and k2 denote the two alternative housing states,
and let h1, h2, and h3 denote the three health states in the model. In the revised model
the value function V depends not only on health and housing, but also on wealth, and is
denoted V(W,r, z; t) where W is the household's wealth at the start of period t.
In the extended model the individual chooses both where to live, and her level of
consumption in each period. To determine the optimal housing choice and level of con-
sumption, it is convenient to break the problem into two steps. In the first step, each
housing alternative is considered in turn, and for each alternative, the optimal level ofElderly Health,Housing, and Mobility -27
consumption is computed, assuming that alternative were to be chosen. Thus we define
three interim value functions, one for each housing alternative, as follows:
=max log[c(t)}U(j,i) +5 qo(j,z;t)V(W1,z,i;t+1)+ cP) z=1,2,3
5(1— qo(j,z;t)jB(Wj —ec)
z=l,2,3






where 11,2, is wealth at the start of period t + 1, which depends upon c(t) and
must be computed separately (and iii general will be different) for each of the three housing
states according to the procedure described above, and x is the utility cost of moving, as
before. In the second step, a comparision is made amongst the three values R,, Rk,, and
Rk2, and the largest of these three is chosen; consumption is then equal to the value which
was found to maximize the above expression for the appropriate R function,
The extension of this calculation to the case in which mobility costs last more than
one year, and to the case in which there is a separation cost, are straightforward and arc
not presented here.
Section 5: Simulation results for the second model
In this section I present results obtained from simulating several different versions of
the extended model of elderly housing and consumption. I first present results for a version
of the model in which there are no mobility costs apart from a financial transaction cost.
Then I turn to results for specifications of the model in which there are mobility costs,
beginning with a model in which there are both temporary utility costs and health costs,
and then discussing a specification in which there are both permanent separation costs
and health costs. Finally, I explore the sensitivity of my findings to modifications in my
parameterizations of the bequest function, the utility function, and the rate of appreciation
of future housing prices. Throughout, I contrast the results for the extended model to the
comparable results for the simpler model of elderly housing decisions analyzed in section
3.Elderly Health, HousingndMobihty
Asmy detailed review of the results will show, the results for the extendedmodel tend
to corroborate the earlier findings for the first, simpler model of mobility. In particular.
mobility is significantly affected by mobility costs, the pattern of mobility (with age) is
different depending on whether there are temporary utility costs or a permanent separation
cost of moving, and transitional housing emerges as an important modeling construct.
housing a large proportion of the population, especially at older ages, and, in some versions
of the model, serving as a pre-death absorbing state.
Figure 4 presents a set of simulation results for the version of the extended model
in which the only mobility cost is the 6% financial charge on the sale of a conventional
or transitional home. In this figure, and all subsequent figures, the graphs refer to the
projected experience of an elderly person, who as of age 65 is in good health, lives in
a convention home which he or she owns and which is worth $200,000, and possesses
an additional $50,000 in liquid assets. The top panel in this figure depicts the average
probability of a move, at each age, separately for men and women. For both sexes mobility
is approximately 6% at age 65, rises steadily to its peak in the early SO's, at whch point it
is 15% for women and 17% for men, and then falls sharply. Panel two depicts the fraction
of individuals living in conventional, transitional, and institutional housing, again as a
function of age. As expected, the fraction living in conventional housing falls steadily over
time, from near 100% to near 0%, the fraction living in transitional housing rises steadily.
from near 0% to near 100%, and the fraction living in institutions rises slowly, from near
0% at age 65 to slightly less than 10% in the late 80's (before falling at age 90). Finally.
panel three depicts the average ratio of consumption to wealth amongst those living at
each age, again separately for men and women. According to the graph, for both men and
women the proportion of wealth consumed is near 12% at age 65, and falls slowly with
age, to approximately 6% at age 90; women exhibit slightly larger consumption ratios than
men at younger ages, and ratios essentially identical to those of men at older ages.
Panels one and two of figure 4 are directly comparable to the two panels of figure 1,
which depict the corresponding graphs for the zero mobility cost specification of the first
model of elderly housing, considered in sections 2 and 3. The only substantial difference
between the two models is that in the earlier model mobility rises monotonically with age,
whereas in the model of this section mobility first rises, but then falls at very old ages.
To gain greater insight into the shapes of the graphs depicted in figure 4, consider
several facts which emerge from a detailed examination of the simulation results for theElderly HealLh, Housing,and Mobility -29
model. First, as in the earlier zero mobility cost model, the elderly nearly always move
into their optimal housing state immediately following a change in health status. Thus
the financial transaction cost does not by itself discourage mobility; further, elderly do
not choose to move out of conventional housing in order to invest more of their assets in
savings, so as to earn a higher rate of return (2% versus 1% on housing) on their wealth.
The one situation in which the elderly do not always choose to move into their preferred
housing state is when they possess very low wealth; in this case they often choose not
to move, and, when they do move, at times follow what may be called a "bankruptcy"
strategy in which they intentionally move to an institution, exhaust all of their wealth.
and become a ward of the state.
A second set of facts concerns the consumption decisions of the elderly. At must ages
and for most housing and health states consumption is only slightly more than aniiuitv
income. The primary reason consumption is maintained at this modest level is to protect
the size of the bequest, which exerts a substantial impact on total utility. In fact, the
importance of the bequest helps explain why the ratio of consumption to wealth falls at
very old ages: at these ages death is immanent (recall that in the model all individuals die
by age 91), and individuals would rather hoard their wealth for the bequest than spend it
on consumption. A contributing factor in this explanation is the fact that many individuals
suffer from either moderate disabilities or poor health at these older ages, and therefore
benefit less from consumption (recall that utility is the log of consumption multiplied by
a function which depends on health and housing). Finally, a last reason why consumption
is maintained at modest levels is to hoard resources which may be needed either to pay
the financial transaction cost associated with selling a conventional or transitional home,
or to pay the costs of institutional care.
The simulation results also provide information about the relationship between
wealth, mobility, and housing. Consider the results for men. At age 68, average wealth
among the living is $229,000, $21,000 below wealth at age 65. At this age, amongst
those who move average wealth is $227,000, amongst those living in conventional hous-
ing average wealth is $229, 000, and amongst those living in transitional housing average
wealth is $234,000. At age 80, average wealth has fallen slightly to $213, 000. At age
80, average wealth is $209,000 amongst those who move, $207,000 amongst those living
in conventional housing, and $217,000 amongst those living in transitional housing. Note
that average wealth is highest for those living in transitional housing; at least in part thisElderly Health, Hou,ing,and Mobility 3u
resultis due to the fact that for these individuals the marginal utility of consuinptioii
is lower than for those in (good health and living in) conventional housing. Results are
similar for women and are not reported here.
Now consider a version of the extended model in which there are both 2 year tempo-
rary utility costs of moving and 2 year health costs, in addition to the financial transaction
costs. I assess the health costs at the same level as in the earlier models. When the utility
costs are set at a value of 0.4, comparable to those used to generate the results presented
in figure 2 and discussed at length in section 3, the simulation results indicate that there is
no mobility. Apparently, the combination of substantial health, financial, and utility costs
is sufficient to discourage all mobility. When the utility costs are reduced to 0.2. there is
mobility, and it is this specification which I will discuss in detail.
Figure 5 presents results from the simulation of the model with 2 year utility costs
of moving set at the value 0.2 (plus 2 year health costs and financial costs of moving).
Interestingly, the mobility pattern predicted by this model, show in the top panel, is very
close to that predicted by the corresponding earlier model with utility costs of 0.4, depicted
in the top panel of figure 2. In both models the mobility of men is approximately 6% from
age 65 to the early 70's, then plunges to zero, soars to a height of 25% for a single year.
then falls sharply back to under 10% the next year, followed by a graduate descent, and
then sharp increase at age 90. Clearly, this complex pattern is not an artifact induced by
a peculiarity of specification, but is robust to alternative modeling structures. For women.
mobility is much smoother over time, remaining at approximately 6% from age 65 to age 80,
and then falling smoothly, rising sharply at age 90. The second panel in figure 5 illustrates
the fraction of individuals residing in conventional, transitional, and institutional housing,
as a function of age, and is again very similar to the corresponding diagram in figure 2.
Finally, the third panel in figure 5 depicts the average ratio of consumption to wealth.
separately for men and women, as a function of age. As in the corresponding graph i
figure 4, the ratio falls with age, and the ratio is somewhat higher for women, especially
at younger ages.
A detailed examination of the simulation results shows that the only move which
elderly consistently make is from conventional housing to transitional housing, undertaken
when their health deteriorates from good to moderately disabled. They never move into an
institution, except occasionally at very low wealth levels when they adopt the bankruptcy
strategy alluded to earlier. Further, they never move back from transitional housing toElderly Heiiib, Housing,ndMobility 31
conventionalhousing when their health improves. Thus, as in the earlier models with
mobility costs, transitional housing turns out to be a pre-death absorbing state. The con-
clusion is that the basic importance of transitional housing is preserved when the original
model is extended to include a far richer specification of economic variables and decisions.
The finding that the ratio of consumption to wealth is slightly higher for women than
for men, true in both of the two models just considered, seems to be due to the fact that
men are relatively more likely to die, and therefore more likely to leave a bequest in the
near future. Since the value of the bequest is quite high, and, in particular, the marginal
value of additional dollars preserved for the bequest is high relative to the marginal value
of extra dollars of consumption (evaluated at the relevant baseline values indicated by the
simulations), meii have greater incentive to hoard their wealth.9
The extended model with separation and health costs of moving is depicted in figure
6; for this figure, the model was simulated with a separation cost of 0.2 and a one year
health cost of moving, the same specification used to generate the comparable results for
the earlier model for which results are depicted in figure 3. As the top graph in figure 6
shows, men do not move at all until past age 80; they then experience a sharp spike iii
mobility, which lasts for several years and is due to the unleashing of mobility amongst
those in mismatched housing, followed by a decline to modest mobility levels in the last
years of life. For women, mobility first begins at age 77, is followed by a very sharp one-year
spike in mobility, and then gradually declines to modest levels. These mobility patterns
are quite similar to those depicted in the top panel of figure 3, except that mobility begins
at later ages in the model depicted in figure 6. The second panel in figure 6 depictes the
fraction of individuals living in the various housing states, and is again quite similar to
the corresponding graph in figure 3. Finally, panel three of figure 6 denotes the average
ratio of consumption to wealth; as with the earlier graphs of this ratio in figures 4 and
5, the ratio falls smoothly with age, in this case beginning just above 12% and falling to
approximately 6%, with the ratio higher for women than for men at all ages.
Section 6: Concluding comments
The analysis of elderly mobility presented in this paper has generated a number of
interesting insights. Most importantly, I have found that the economic model of mobility
can predict realistic levels of mobility, when enriched to include a variety of mobilityElderly Health,Housing, and Mobility -32
costs.In addition, my analysis indicates the importance of transitional housing, which is
predicted to become an absorbing state for the elderly in many situations.
I believe the analysis could be fruitfully extended in several directions. Rather than
specifying only three housing states, it would be more realistic to consider a larger num-
ber. One way to to do this would be to define a bundle of housing attributes, including
architectural design variables, location variables, and health services variables. Then each
particular bundle of attributes might be considered to be a viable housing alternative. If
prices were attached to each attribute (or small bundle of attributes), such a model would
fit naturally into the framework developed in section four.
A second important extension would incorporate uncertainty over future housing
prices. Finally, a third extension would refine the definition of health states, perhaps by
considering several "representative" patterns of aging. For each such pattern, a specific
health transition matrix could be specified. In addition, each pattern could be associated
with its own health-housing matching utility function, based on the relationship between
the health scenario and specific housing attributes.Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility.33
Appendix
In this appendix I describe the sources used and steps taken to construct tables 1 and
2. The two primary sources for these tables are Manton (1988) and Feinstein and Keatiiig
(1992). In table 4 of his 1988 paper Manton presents estimates of two year transition
probabilities based on data from the 1982 and 1984 National Long Term Care Survey.
Manton considers the following 1982 groups: no disability; IADL only; 1 to 2 ADLs; 3
to 4 ADLs; 5 to 6 ADLs; and institutionaJized (there are also nonrespondents). Since I
am specifying a model with only three health states, I have combined certain of Mantons
categories together; in particular, I have considered Manton's first group, not disabled, to
be equivalent to my category "good health;" his categories IADLs, 1 to 2 ADLs, 3 to 4
ADLs, and 5 to 6 ADLs, summed, to be equivalent to my category "moderately disabled
health;" and his institutionalized category to be equivalent to my category of the same
name. For the 1984 data, Manton forms the same categories, plus one additional category,
deceased (again, there is a small problem with nonrespondents).
I have needed to make two main modifications to Manton's data. First, his data refers
to transitions over a two year period, whereas I require one-year transition probabilities.
Second, his numbers clearly sharply understate the probability that an individual will
be admitted to an institution at some point between 1982 and 19S4, since it records
institutionalization only at a single 1984 date; related to this is the fact that his numbers
greatly overstate the probability of death when in "good" or "moderately disabled" health.
since they do not capture a common sequence in which an elderly enters an institution for
a short stay before dying. To resolve these two issues I have drawn on tables in Feinsteiii
and Keating.
I use Manton's numbers, unmodified, to compute
Probability(goodhealthin t + 1moderately disabled in t)
Probability(moderately disabled health in t + 1good health in t)
separately for men and women, for each of the five year age averages Manton reports
(65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85—). I also impose the assumption that
Probability(good health in t + flpoor health in t) = 0
for all ages for both men and women. I use Feinstein and Keating, table 1, directly for
Probability(poor health in t + 1good health in t)Elderly Health, Housin,and Mobhty34
(thisprobability is assumed to be equivalent to the probability of nursing home entry as
reported in that table; in that sense, it is probably something of an underestimate). I also
rely on certain multipliers reported in Feinstein and Keating to set
Probability(poor health in t + 1rrzoderately disabled health in t)
For younger ages, I set this value to 2.5 times the probability assessed for those in good
health in year t; at older ages, I reduce this figure to 1.5 times the probability assessed for
those in good health in year t.
I use table 4 of Feinstein and Keating (based on data from the National Nursing
Home Survey), which reports detailed statistics on nursing home duration and discharge
status, to determine
Probability(rnoderately disabled health in t + llpoor health in t)
Note that whereas Feinsteiri and Keating present a discrete hazard model in which length
of stay varies from as little as 14 days to as much as 7 years, for the purposes of this paper
I have simplified their numbers to a simple one-year probability; the probability that a
person continues in poor health in t + 1, denoted
Probability(poor health in t + 1poor health int)
is taken from their numbers. But in the construction I am using in this paper, nursing home
duration is assumed to follow a Markov process; empirical results reported by Garber and
MaCurdy (1989) suggest that this is incorrect, and that there is some duration dependnce.
I also use the Feinstein and Keating numbers to assess
Probability(death in year t + 1poor health in i)
The most complex calculation I have performed in constructing tables I and 2 involves
determining
Probability(death in year t + lIgood health in t)
Probability(death in year t + llmoderately disabled health in t)
neither of which can be drawn directly from Manton' work, for reasons I discussed above.
To estimate these probabilities I have modified Manton's numbers by subtracting fromElderly Health Housing, and ?lolality- 35
eachof the death probabilities he reports for these two health groups an estimate of the
probability that an individual of that health level first entered an institution (poor health
in my model) and then died. The probability of death, given institutionalization, is set as
follows: 0.5, men aged 65 to 74; .46, men aged 75 to 84; .48, men aged 85 to 90; .5, women
aged 65 to 74; .54, women aged 75 to 84; and .62, women aged 85 to 90. Since Mantons
sample shrinks with age, I have deduced this rate of shrinkage, and, assuming constant
proportionate reduction in sample size each year, determined age weights. This step is
necessary because, as shown in Feinsteiri and Keating's table 1, the probability of nursing
home entry varies with age. The shrinkage numbers are: .88 per year for men aged 65 to
74 (no shrinkage); .88 per year for men aged 75 to 90; .94 per year, women aged 65 to 74;
.91 per year, women aged 75 to 84; .85 per year, women aged 85 to 90. For a shrinkage
parameter i,forinitial state i (good or moderately disabled), and for probability of death
conditional of institutionalization of ,Ithen computed
>J1=ageaP(poorhealth in t + 1 or + 2Ii),.'
P(deathjz) = Manton# — (;...)
=age.
For future reference, I will refer to this computed probability as
Ultimately I have wished to compare my estimate of these death probabilities based
on Manton's table with the corresponding numbers in Feinstein and Keating. However.
Feinstein and Keating, using data from National Life Tables, do not divide the population
into good health and moderately disabled health (they simply use non-institutionalized,
vs. institutionalized —adivision which is commonplace since separate death statistics are
generally commonly available only for nursing home patients, who are assumed, in my
model, to be in poor health). I have formed a weighted (by population) average of my
modified Manton probabilities for the two health classes, good and moderately disabled.
for each age and sex class, and compared these to the Feinstein and Keating numbers. For
the most part the two different estimates are close, though not identical. I have generally
chosen a number midway between the two, and used that as my estimate of
Probability(death in t + llgood or moderately disabled in t)
This gives me a scaling factor for the Feinstein and Keating numbers, which are: 1.17,
men aged 65 to 74; 1.08, men aged 75 to 84; 1.06, men aged 85 to 90; 1.7, women aged 65
to 74; 1.1, women aged 75 to 90. For reference below, I will denote the scaled FeinsteinElderly Health, Housing.andMobility-36
andKeatingvalues as FKMOD. The number for women age 65 to 74 is so high because
the probability of death, when in good or moderately disabled health, is very low for this
group, so that small errors in either set of numbers generate large proportionate differences.
Having determined an estimate of
Probability(death in t + 1good or moderately disabled in t)
Ithen decompose this into separate estimates of the probabilties for those in good health
as opposed to those who are moderately disabled. I do this in several steps. First, since
Manton's figures suggest that the relative size of these two classes varies with age. I
have determined weights which reflect these relative percentages; the weights, denoted
w1 and w2 (they sum to one) are chosen to vary with age so as to smoothly inter-
polate between the average ratios within each age group. Second, I use my original
modified estimates from Manton's numbers of Probability(deathgood health) (.\) and
Probability(deathlrnoderately disabled) (\2) to assess the relative chances of death in
each class:
=0
andsolve the following equation for ,\i:
w1)1+ w2aA2 FKMOD
for each age and sex class. I then have values for each of A1 and A2. As a final step, I
smooth these probabilties over ages, so that they are nondecreasing.Elderly HealthHousing, and Mobility
Foot notes
1. This is in fact a rather large discount rate, meaning that in this model elderly place
a high value on the future. Note however that mortality risk is explicitly included in the
model,so this reflects true discounting, with no correction for the risk of death.
2. Scitovsky shows that end-of-life health costs vary only slightly withage and sex of the
deceased.
3. Some interesting quantitative evidence on the direct, transient utility costs ofmoving
has been assembled by Venti arid Wise (1990), in the context of estimates of mobility based
on the Retirement History Survey. They assume that the transaction costs of moving are
proportionate to utility (they assume a multiplicative, or log-linear form for utility), and
allow the magnitude of these costs to depend on initial health status. Venti and \Vise then
infer the magnitude of these costs by estimating a model of mobility; as mobility isvery
low in their data, they infer a quite large value for transaction costs, as much as 50 of
one year utility; they also find that costs (as a proportion of utility) are larger when au
individual is in worse health. However, Venti and Wise do not specifyany sort of morbidity
or mortality tables, and do not allow for the possibility that a move may affect morbidity
or mortality. In addition, they do not explicitly posit a utility function which depends oiu
both housing and health, and do not fit an optimizing dynamic model of the kind r develop
in this paper.
4. \Vhen the transaction cost is this high, the results never exhibit a mobility pattern in
which a person in poor health moves to transitional housing, in which case total utility
would have been negative.
5. Subject to a monotonicity constraint which says that, for example, the probability of
death be nondecreasing with age.
6. In the simulations, I impose the restriction that a household is not allowed to move into
a house if its total wealth falls below 25% of the house's price, an assumption which serves
to eliminate the possibility of a household increasing its debt to very high levels, and is
consistent with most mortgage lending rules.
'.Thisand the other implicit assumptions made in the following few paragraphs are all
found to be part of all the optimal solutions found via the computer simulations.
8,am assuming that the household cannot refinance its mortgage, and that it simply
pays the interest due on its loan, based on the home's current price, Tmyp&(t), each period.EIde1y Health, Housing,and Mobility -
. Asimple calculation shows that the marginal utility associated with an additional $1, 000
invested in the bequest, when its baseline value is $200,000, is nearly 10 times higher than
the marginal utility associated with consuming the extra $1,000, when the baseline level
of consumption is $20,000. In part, this difference is due to the absolute worth of the
bequest; but it is also due to the fact that the bequest is a square root function, whereas
consumption is logarithmic, and hence relatively flatter at high dollar values.Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility - 39
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Probability of Death in the Next Year
As a Function of Current Health State
By Age and Sex; Effect of Mobility —ModifiedCase
a. Men
b. WomenFrom GoodTo: FromModerately Disaied To: From Poor To:
Age GoodModeratePoor GoodModeratePoor GoodModeratePoor
65 .9180.0510 .0158 .0730 .8500 .0395 .0000 .4600 .0500
66 .9110 .0550 .0158 .0700 .8465 .0395 .0000 .4600 .0500
67 .9032 .0600 .0158 .0680 .8425 .0395 .0000 .4600 .0500
68 .8952 .0650 .0158 .0650 .8375 .0395 .0000 .4600 .0500
69 .8855 .0700 .0175 .0630.8270.0450 .0000 .4600 .0500
70 .8780 .0750 .0190 .0610.8240.0480 .0000 .4500 .0500
71 .8698 .0800 .0202 .0590.8185 .0505 .0000 .4500 .0500
72 .8618 .0840 .0202 .0570 .8105 .0505 .0000 .4500 .0500
73 .8538 .0880 .0202 .0550 .8035 .0505 .0000 .4500 .0500
74 .8465 .0900 .0215 .0540 .7940 .0520 .0000 .4500 .0500
75 .8400 .0950 .0230 .0530 .7895 .0575 .0000 .4000 .0500
76 .8332 .1000 .0248 .0500 .7860 .0620 .0000 .4000 .0500
77 .8191 .1100 .0269 .0450 .7838 .0672 .0000 .4000 .0500
78 .8048 .1200 .0292 .0400 .7810 .0730 .0000 .4000 .0500
79 .7884 .1300 .0316 .0350 .7810 .0758 .0000 .4000 .0500k
80 .7725 .1400 .0345 .0300 .7789 .0811.0000 .4000 .0500
81 .7561 .1500 .0379 .0250 .7758 .0872 .0000 .4000 .0500
82 .7380 .1600 .0420 .0200.7676 .0924 .0000 .3900 .0500
83 .7198 .1700 .0472 .0160 .7636 .0944 .0000 .3700 .0500






90 .5635.2200 .1125.C130.6730.1570.0000.2800.0400From Good To: From Moderately Disabled To: From Poor To
Age GoodModeratePoor GoodModeratePoor Good.foderaePoor
65 .9224 .0600 .0158 .1000 .8535 .0395 .0000 .4750 .0550
66 .9159 .0650 .0158 .0900 .8575 .0395 .0000 .4750 .0550
67 .9092 .0700 .0158 .0800 .8605 .0395 .0000 .4750 .0550
68 .9074 .0700 .0158 .0800 .8533 .0395 .0000 .4750 .0550
69 .8967 .0770 .0175 .0750 .8462 .0438 .0000 .4600 .0500
70 .8880 .0830 .0202 .0700 .8445 .0505 .0000 .4500 .0460
71 .8808 .0900 .0202 .0650 .8485 .0505 .0000 .4340 .0460
72 .8728 .0970 .0202 .0580 .8515 .0505 .0000 .4340 .0460
73 .8628 .1050 .0202 .0500 .8575 .0505 .0000 .4340 .0460
74 .8505 .1130 .0215 .0420 .8592 .0538 .0000 .4340 .0460
75 .8385 .1220 .0230 .0350 .8595 .0575 .0000 .4250 .0450
76 .8272 .1300 .0248 .0300 .8580 .0620 .0000 .4150 .0450
77 .8161 .1380.0269 .0260 .8584 .0646 .0000 .4150 .0450
78 .8028 .1460 .0292 .0220 .8544 .0686 .0000 .4150 .0450
79 .7894 .1540 .0316 .0190 .8483 .0727 .0000 .4150 .0450
80 .7735 .1620 .0345 .0160 .8431 .0759 .0000 .4080 .0420
81 .7591 .1700 .0379 .0130 .8415 .0795 .0000 .3990 .0410
82 .7430 .1780 .0420 .0100 .8390 .0840 .0000 .3900 .0400
83 .7258 .1860 .0472 .0070 .8343 .0897 .0000 .3810 .0390
84 .7085 .1940 .0525 .0050 .8305 .0945 .0000 .3720 .0380
85 .6918 .2020 .0602 .0030 .8247 .1023 .0000 .3630 .0370
86 .6718 .2120 .0682 .0010 .8179 .1091 .0000 .3540 .0360
87 .6505 .2220 .0765 .0000 .8112 .1148 .0000 .3440 .0360
88 .6305 .2320 .0855 .0000 .7977 .1283 .0000 .3440 .0360
89 .6085 .2420 .0975 .0000 .7787 .1463 .0000 .3340 .0360















































































































































90 .2370.3300.2250.0092.5153.2355.0000.1440From Good To: From Moderately Disabled To: From Poor To:
GoodModeratePoor GoodModeratePoor GoodModeratePoor
65 .8254 .1200.0474 .0500 .8303 .0988 .0000 .2400 .0550























































































Mobility Costs: Two Year Utility Cost of .4 Plus










Only Mobility Cost: Financial Transaction Cost
a. Mobility
b. Residence
c. Ratio of Consumption to Wealth
Figure 5
Simulation Results —SecondModel
Mobility Costs: Financial, Two Year Utility Cost of .2,
And Two Year Health Cost
a. Mobility
b. ResidenceElderly He&lth, Housing,ndMobility - 43
c.Ratio of Consumption to Wealth
Figure 6
Simulation Results —SecondModel
Mobility Costs: Financial, Separation Cost of .2,
And One Year Health Cost
a, Mobility
b. Residence
c. Ratio of Consumption to Wealth0
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